Fundamental Investing Is Harrowing: Here’s Why

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Bradford Cornell
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As usual, I find it helpful to work with an example.  The example used here is Apple because it is a relatively easy company to value.  On September 21, 2918, Prof. Aswath Damodaran posted on his website a valuation of Apple that included a full DCF model (available here).  His basic premise was that Apple was a mature company so that its revenues would grow at the same nominal rate as the overall economy.  On this basis, he assumed that the growth rate for Apple revenue was 3.00%.  Applying that assumption, Prof. Damodaran arrived at a fundamental value of Apple of $201.50 per share.  On that basis, he sold his Apple stock at the then current price of $220.00.

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In the fundamental valuation of Apple prepared at Cornell Capital, we basically agreed with Prof. Damodaran’s outlook for the company and most of the details of his valuation with one exception.  We assumed that the long-run nominal growth rate for the US economy would be 5.0% (about 2.48% real growth and 2.48% inflation) rather than 3.00%.  If you go to Prof. Damodaran’s spreadsheet and substitute 5.00% for 3.00% (and change nothing else), the estimated value per share jumps from $201.50 to $279.00.  That implies that Prof. Damodaran should have been buying rather than selling!

The point here is not to argue that 3.00%, 5.00% or some other number is the proper growth rate, but to emphasize that even for a large mature company with a huge cash hoard, a relatively small change in a key assumption can have a huge impact on estimated value.  That is what makes fundamental investing harrowing.  It is reason why at Cornell Capital we do not take speculative positions in individual securities unless the evidence of mispricing is significant.  In our view, Apple is not an example.

Finally, if you think valuing Apple is scary, what about its trillion dollar cousin, Amazon?  In Amazon’s case, the great majority of the value comes from forecasts of future growth that are well in excess of those for the U.S. economy.  Reduce those growth assumptions and the value drops dramatically.

Article by Brad Cornell’s Economics Blog

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Bradford Cornell is an emeritus Professor of Financial Economics at the Anderson School of Management at UCLA. Prof. Cornell has taught courses on Applied Corporate Finance, Investment Banking, and Corporate Valuation. He is currently developing a new course on Energy, Climate Change and Finance. Professor Cornell received his Masters degree in Statistics and his PhD in Financial Economics from Stanford University. In his academic capacity, Professor Cornell has published more than 125 articles on a wide variety of topics in applied finance, particularly empirical analysis of asset pricing models. He is also the author of Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making, published by Business One Irwin, The Equity Risk Premium and the Long-Run Future of the Stock Market, published by John Wiley and Conceptual Foundations of Investing published by John Wiley. He is a past Director and Vice-President of the Western Finance Association and a past Director of the American Finance Association. As a consultant, Professor Cornell has provided testimony and expert analysis in some of the largest and most widely publicized finance related cases in the United States. Among his clients are AT&T, Berkshire Hathaway, Bristol-Myers, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, General Motors, Goldman Sachs, Merck, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, PG&E, Price Waterhouse, Verizon, Walt Disney and various agencies of the United States Government. Professor Cornell is also a senior advisor to Rayliant Global Investors and to the Cornell Capital Group. In both capacities, he provides advice on fundamental investment valuation. In his free time Prof. Cornell enjoys cycling and golf.